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In her more recent work, Chantal Mouffe enters into what she calls a 
‘dialogue’ with Carl Schmitt on the political. So far, interpretations of this 
dialogue suggest that Mouffe attempts to revise Schmitt’s friend/enemy-
distinction and carve out a theory of agonistic pluralism. An interpretation on 
these grounds, this article argues, reduces the dialogue to its analytical 
dimension and cannot comfortably be uphold. Mouffe indeed appropriates 
Schmitt’s friend/enemy-distinction, but she also gets inspired by the 
metatheoretical facet of his intellectual heritage to the result that her theory 
becomes organically interwoven with a polemical dimension. Rather than 
aiming at a poststructuralist defanging of Schmitt’s conception of the political, 
Mouffe recontextualizes and applies it to current academic discourse, for this 
allows decontesting her radical pluralist cause by establishing a we/them 
opposition along a political/post-political divide. 
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Introduction1 
After World War II Carl Schmitt has long been a red rag to scholars because 
of his complicity with National Socialism, and up to the present day especially 
democratic theorists make strenuous efforts to avoid being linked to his 
thought. Chantal Mouffe, in contrast, is among those few who emphasize the 
benefits of reconsidering his work. ‘Not the moral qualities’, she says, ‘should 
be the decisive criteria when deciding whether we need to establish a 
dialogue’ with a thinker’s work, but ‘the intellectual force’.2  
Since the mid 1990s, Mouffe has established such a dialogue in her 
writings.3 The interpretation thereof appears very much straightforward: 
Mouffe attempts to analytically revise Schmitt’s friend/enemy-distinction 
along poststructuralist and nonessentialist lines in order to provide a viable 
theory of democracy. The result is ‘agonistic pluralism’, which claims to 
come to terms with Schmitt’s insight that conflictuality among groups 
determines our ontological condition while at the same time providing the 
conceptual key which allows for a differential treatment of conflictuality. In 
the secondary literature, there are considerable discussions on whether 
Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism successfully accomplishes such a goal. Actually, 
most think that it does not. Yet, although commentators have provided 
different and not always mutually compatible criticisms, they do not examine 
whether Mouffe’s scholarly goal is adequately grasped in the first place. 
Commentators conspicuously concur in suggesting that Mouffe’s dialogue 
with Schmitt is sufficiently understood if characterized as an analytical 
revision of the friend/enemy-distinction, more precisely, as the attempt of a 
poststructuralist defanging.4 
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Intuitively, it is uncontroversial to read the dialogue in traditional 
analytical terms, if only because the method of scrutinizing another writer’s 
conceptual apparatus, revealing inherent problems, trying to tackle them, and 
deducing implications is a standard procedure in the discipline of political 
theory. Additional credence is lent to this interpretation since Mouffe herself 
abets it in many places. Schmitt’s thought, she justifies her entering into a 
dialogue, contains crucial insights into the political and reveals basic flaws of 
liberalism; and answering Schmitt’s challenge means ‘devising ways in which 
antagonism can be transformed into agonism’.5 Although I have no doubts 
that a reconceptualization of Schmitt’s friend/enemy-distinction is an 
important part of a convincing interpretation of Mouffe’s dialogue with 
Schmitt, I argue that it cannot comfortably be reduced to this dimension. 
Scrutinizing her writings against the backdrop of the theoretical peculiarities 
of her account and Schmitt’s multi-faceted intellectual heritage leads us 
instead to modify our interpretation of the dialogue. We come to detect a 
polemical facet that – rather than supplementing the analytical dimension – is 
organically interwoven with it and culminates in a theorization of the political 
which is dissociative in conceptual character and scholarly gesture.6  
To set out my argument, I first sketch the contours of the analytical 
dimension of Mouffe’s dialogue with Schmitt, mostly on her own terms. 
Then, I discuss three criticisms that have been formulated by commentators. 
Not only do they help to understand better her theory of agonistic pluralism; 
they also reveal that Mouffe arrives at surprisingly different conclusions from 
Derrida in his deconstruction of the friend/enemy-distinction. In the third 
section, I search for an explanation for this oddity and call to mind the 
metatheoretical facet of Schmitt’s intellectual heritage. I argue that Mouffe 
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appropriates Schmitt’s friend/enemy-distinction in his anthropomorphic 
conceptualization because she also gets inspired by his remarks about the 
polemical nature of political theorizing in general, and theorizing the political 
in particular. 
Before preparing the ground for my argument by reconstructing Mouffe’s 
theory of agonistic pluralism, it should be noted that Mouffe is not the first to 
theorize about the political under the term ‘agonistic pluralism’, or very 
similar ones. Moreover, the conceptions of agonistic pluralism brought 
forward by scholars such as William Connolly, Bonnie Honig, or James Tully 
significantly diverge from Mouffe’s account theoretically inasmuch as in 
terms of adherence to philosophical traditions, as well as, arguably, with 
regard to the purposes to which the theories are put to use. My exclusive 
interest is in Mouffe’s variant, and the interpretation of her dialogue with 
Schmitt through which she arrives at it.7 
 
1 Thinking with, against, and beyond Schmitt: the analytical dimension 
In his essay The Concept of the Political Schmitt argues that in order to 
understand the political we must investigate its specific ultimate distinction – 
just the way we proceed when determining the moral, the aesthetic, or the 
economic. Whereas the moral, the aesthetic, and the economic are 
traditionally explained in terms of good and evil, beautiful and ugly, and 
profitable and unprofitable, there should be a likewise special, independent, 
and somewhat obvious criterion of the political. While Max Weber could not 
imagine a constitutive distinction along these lines for the political,8 Schmitt is 
not lost for an answer. The fundamentum divisionis of the political, he tells us, 
is the distinction between friend and enemy.9 
 4 
Mouffe considers Schmitt’s conception of the political still pertinent. 
Thinking with Schmitt, she points out, we can instantaneously gain three basal 
insights: first, the political does not constitute a specific sphere or level of 
society, but determines our ontological condition.10 Second, the subjects of the 
political are collectives. The political concerns the moment of the 
association/dissociation of groups of people.11 Finally, political relations are 
necessarily conflictual. Interests of competitors or disagreement of discussants 
might be resolved by means of negotiation or deliberation. Political 
oppositions, however, foreclose any rational consensus. By determining the 
political as the distinction between friend and enemy, Schmitt anticipates the 
poststructuralist insight into the relational nature of identities according to 
which the precondition for the existence of any identity is something other 
that constitutes its exterior. The construction of a ‘we’, Mouffe tells us, 
requires the demarcation of a ‘them’ which serves as its ‘constitutive outside’ 
in the process of identity-formation.12 Taken together, Schmitt’s conception of 
the political reveals that whoever sympathizes with the overcoming of 
factionism (especially by means of an all-inclusive, rational consensus) 
indulges in wishful thinking because conflict is constitutive of the intercourse 
of political collectives and thus ineradicable from social life. 
Despite these crucial insights into the political, however, Mouffe feels a 
strong anti-pluralist bias looming in Schmitt’s conception which requires her 
to part company with him. ‘[T]he main limitation of Schmitt’s friend/enemy-
discrimination’, she argues, ‘is that while he asserts the conflictual nature of 
the political, he does not permit a differential treatment of this 
conflictuality’.13 As a result, the only feasible and legitimate pluralism is a 
pluralism of states.14 In these remarks, Mouffe alludes to a wide-spread 
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criticism against Schmitt’s conception. Since she does not repeat it in detail, 
some brief explanations will be helpful to recall the reproach. 
According to many critics, Schmitt determines political oppositions in not 
simply a conflictual, but in fact bellicose way.15 Whereas most approaches 
that envisage politics ‘sub specie belli’ and not ‘sub specie consensus’ treat 
conflict primarily as standing metaphorically for pluralist political 
intercourse,16 ‘bellum’ in Schmitt’s account gains a surprisingly literal 
meaning. Politics is close to being identified with war. The opposition of 
friend and enemy does not mean: 
‘competition, nor does it mean pure intellectual controversy nor symbolic 
wrestlings in which, after all, every human being is somehow always 
involved, for it is a fact that the entire life of a human being is struggle 
and every human being symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy, and 
combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer 
to the real possibility of physical killing’.17 
 
Admittedly, Schmitt makes some efforts to avoid conflating the conflictual 
reality of the political with war. On the one hand, he attempts to reduce 
physical killing to an ‘ever present possibility’ or the ‘leading presupposition’ 
of the political.18 On the other hand, he distances himself from Clausewitz’s 
dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means. However, 
although his reasoning is conclusive to a great extent, neither remark is 
ultimately capable of dispelling concerns about the bellicose tendency.  
The first reservation faces a logical inconsistency. Schmitt singles out the 
friend/enemy-distinction precisely because it is alone capable of escalating 
into warlike antagonism. In order to be political, Schmitt asserts, an 
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opposition must necessarily comprise the possibility of erupting into violence. 
Thus, Schmitt confers on war a teleological dimension. War turns out to be 
the essence and the goal, the eventuality, and not a mere possibility of the 
political.19 The centrality of physical killing for Schmitt’s conception of the 
political is pointedly revealed by his treatment of pacifism. Pacifists cannot 
become a political movement, he wants to make us believe, as long as they are 
pacifist. They will group themselves as friends against enemies (the non-
pacifists) only when their opposition reaches the necessary grade of intensity 
and resolve, that is, when they are prepared to actually conduct ‘war against 
war’.20  
Schmitt’s other remark, the repudiation of Clausewitz’s infamous dictum, 
is a diversionary tactic. After having rejected it nominally, he laments in a 
footnote that the dictum is generally cited incorrectly.21 Following his 
comment it turns out that Schmitt refrains from considering war as the 
continuation of politics simply because tactics in diplomatic negotiations 
differ from those on the battleground. Apart from the reference to tactical 
differences, there is deafening silence. Differentiations on conceptual or 
normative grounds apparently are deemed dispensable. The goal of war and 
politics for Schmitt is the same. Thus, in fact agreeing with Clausewitz, it 
comes without surprise that in a 1938 corollary to The Concept of the Political 
Schmitt unhesitatingly affirms the dictum and even inflects it: expressing his 
anger about the ‘peace dictate of Versailles’ (‘Pariser Friedensdiktate’) he 
avers that the politics of diplomacy is just another form of continuing war by 
other means, and in fact a particularly perfidious one.22 
For the task of developing a viable theory of democracy the bellicose 
teleology in Schmitt’s conception of the political is evidently unfavourable. If 
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political oppositions are part of our ontological condition and are eventually 
staged violently, there is no place for pluralism inside a community. If the 
community is not to get caught up in turmoil, political conflict must be 
externalized. In short, Schmitt’s conception ‘requires expelling every division 
and antagonism outside the demos’.23  
To adjust the friend/enemy-distinction with a model of democracy 
requires going beyond Schmitt and theorizing the political sub specie belli 
while nevertheless allowing for the possibility of (non-violent) pluralism 
inside a community. The challenge of Carl Schmitt, Mouffe affirms 
subsequently, consists in finding the conceptual means to transform 
antagonism into agonism: 
‘If we want to acknowledge on one side the permanence of the 
antagonistic dimension of conflict, while on the other side allowing for 
the possibility of its »taming«, we need to envisage a [...] type of relation 
which I have proposed to call »agonism«. While antagonism is a we/they 
relation in which the two sides are enemies who do not share any 
common ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting 
parties [… share] a common symbolic space within which the conflict 
takes place’.24  
 
Some commonality among people is required, Mouffe admits, to allow 
treating the members of the opposed collective not in terms of enemies to be 
destroyed but as adversaries to be confronted, and thus to prevent the 
disruption of society. But the necessary common bond does not need to be a 
common good, which would, after all, undermine pluralism.25 The condition 
of possibility of non-violent intercourse within a political community is 
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neither a substantive consensus (as Schmitt holds according to her reading) 
nor a rational consensus (as Mouffe claims Rawls and Habermas would have 
it). A ‘conflictual consensus’, she says, will do.26 The respect of mutual 
democratic citizenship is commonality enough to mitigate political conflicts, 
and it is a commonality that is compatible with substantive forms of 
heterogeneity. Citizens of democratic communities, Mouffe argues, envisage 
the opponent as adversary when confronting each other and thus enable 
‘religious, moral and cultural pluralism, as well as a pluralism of political 
parties’.27 
If that is a rather uncontroversial summary of the analytical claims made 
in Mouffe’s dialogue with Schmitt, then her agonistic pluralism promises to 
be an attractive ‘realistic’ theory of democracy. Apparently, it grounds 
Schmitt’s friend/enemy-distinction in poststructuralist insights, and 
corroborates that political identities form relationally and, for that matter, turn 
out to be inherently conflictual. The institutionalization of an adversarial 
model of politics in the left/right format under a ‘conflictual consensus’ is 
proposed to be the key for the mitigation of conflict. Though irresolvable, the 
conflict of political collectives can take on agonistic forms. Any attempt to 
block the channels through which the political collective(s) from the right and 
the left can stage their conflicts, however, means abolishing the conflictual 
consensus and undoing the conditions of possibility of agonistic conflict. The 
implication to be deduced, it is suggested, is that whoever works toward the 
realization of a politics ‘beyond left and right’, ‘contributes to exacerbating 
the antagonistic potential existing in society’.28 
Commentators of Mouffe’s dialogue with Schmitt certainly provide 
slightly different summaries of Mouffe’s claims. Also, certain variations in 
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hermeneutic observation might be found. Notably, however, the scholarly 
interest in Mouffe’s dialogue with Schmitt has been primarily a systematic 
one so far, to the result that the dialogue is portrayed to be coextensive with 
her theory of agonistic pluralism. More than the question of the interpretation 
of Mouffe’s dialogue, the assessment of the analytical quality of her dealing 
with Schmitt’s conception of the political has caused controversy. I will 
review three critical assessments which, on the one hand, contribute most to 
enhancing our understanding of Mouffe’s theoretical reconsideration of the 
friend/enemy-distinction and whose adequacy, in my view, increases in the 
presented order. On the other hand, discussing these three charges leads us to 
question that there is nothing important to be said about Mouffe’s dialogue 
with Schmitt apart from her variant of agonistic pluralism. The most accurate 
criticism, in fact, implies that neither this theory nor her dialogue with Schmitt 
on the political more generally can be understood unless a dimension, 
complementary to the analytical one, is taken into consideration.  
 
2 Critical encounters 
(a) According to the first assessment, Mouffe attempts to analytically morph 
antagonism into agonism by means of the ‘conflictual consensus’; in other 
words, she attempts to transform Schmitt’s conception of the political into a 
friend/adversary-distinction. While she certainly sanitizes Schmitt, the 
argument runs, she can do so only by departing from antagonism as the 
constitutive feature of the political.29 Why exactly should opposed groups 
refrain from using violence when staging their conflicts? The mitigation of 
antagonism could be accomplished, of course, on the basis of habits (people 
are used to dispense with violence), or a regulative idea (e.g. the Kantian one 
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that informs Habermas’s communicative ethics), or a voluntary and rational 
agreement (e.g. people believe that they can most effectively oppose their 
adversaries under the aegis of the electoral game). By drawing on one of these 
solutions, however, a theory of agonistic pluralism succumbs to the liberal 
‘flaws’ of setting hopes in an overall consensus without exclusions she 
criticizes in the first place. So, does Mouffe’s pluralist agonism silently shift 
into a rationalist and universalistic approach to politics sub specie consensus? 
Does her attempt to transform the enemy into an adversary fail? 
 On some occasions one easily gets this impression; for instance, where 
Mouffe portrays antagonism no longer as permanent, ineradicable, or 
irreducible but instead as an ‘ever present possibility’, or a ‘potential present 
in human relations’;30 or where she advances her argument on the terrain of 
international relations and calls for a ‘truly global’ Jus Publicum 
Europaeum.31 But actually it does not. The attempt does not fail, though, 
because Mouffe does not aim at generally transforming antagonism into 
agonism. She is explicit about that: ‘A democratic society cannot treat those 
who put its basic institutions into question as legitimate adversaries’.32 That 
‘the opponent is to be considered as an adversary whose existence is 
legitimate and must be tolerated,’ applies only ‘within the context of the 
political community’; in turn, ‘[t]he category of the »enemy« […] remains 
pertinent with respect to those who do not accept the democratic »rules of the 
game«’.33 Hence, due to the shared opposition against a superordinate enemy, 
the conflicts among the members of the democratic community are mitigated 
and can take on agonistic forms. However, religious fundamentalists, 
chauvinists, or recalcitrant aristocrats – in a word, all those that have a first-
order commitment to values other than the pluralist-democratic ones – are not 
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adversaries but enemies; and if they are not to be destroyed, then at least they 
need to be excluded from the democratic community.  
 The first criticism exposes ambiguities but does not perfectly apply 
because the category of the enemy remains pertinent. Regarding the 
understanding of agonistic pluralism, therefore, we should expect that 
Mouffe’s conceptual modification of Schmitt’s conception of the political has 
to be located primarily on the side of the in-group: Mouffe’s adversaries as 
compared with Schmitt’s friends; the point being to convert the friend/enemy-
distinction not into a friend/adversary-distinction but into an 
adversary/enemy-distinction. As noted before, Mouffe indeed claims that her 
approach allows for substantive oppositions inside a political community 
whereas Schmitt’s theory allegedly calls for a homogeneous demos and only 
accepts a pluralism of states. If so, however, a second criticism comes into 
play. Were the gist of Mouffe’s theory of agonistic pluralism that political 
collectives within a democratic community can oppose each other in non-
violent terms insofar as they acknowledge the existence of a common and 
comparatively greater enemy, then doubts arise whether this is a significant 
theoretical innovation.34 
(b) Mouffe’s reading of Schmitt is not very generous. On the one hand, 
she suggests that the only political units Schmitt envisages are states whose 
citizens are internally united as friends and externally opposed to other states 
as enemies (cf. endnote 14). In the very first pages of The Concept of the 
Political, however, Schmitt is straightforward in rejecting state-centric 
conceptions of the political.35 Moreover, after World War II Schmitt explicitly 
acknowledges a diversity of political actors. The partisan, not to forget, is then 
one of his political actors par excellence.36  
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On the other hand, considerable doubts arise as to whether Mouffe’s 
conception really allows for a domestic pluralism of higher quality. In The 
Concept of the Political, Schmitt traces situations when no pluralism could be 
found within a political community. In times of absolutism the state had the 
monopoly over the political; ‘the political’, as Oliver Marchart explains 
Schmitt’s view, was ‘a matter only of the external politics between states, 
while internal politics turn[ed] into a question of policing an already 
established order’.37 Apart from that there existed only pseudo-political forms 
of politics that Schmitt calls ‘Politesse’ or ‘petite politique,’ i.e. courtly 
intrigues.38 Yet under conditions of a democratic community such as the 
Weimar Republic, Schmitt affirms, significant (non-violent) antagonisms exist 
within the domestic realm, too. He refers to the pluralism of pressure groups 
in the struggle over policies, and especially party politics.39 There is little 
reason to believe that Schmitt’s conception forecloses pluralism within non-
absolutist political communities. 
To be sure, it needs to be stressed that for Schmitt these domestic 
conflicts are less fundamental than the sovereign’s decision about the order of 
the political community and its enemies. But at the same time we have perfect 
reason to conclude that for Schmitt in political regimes other than absolutist 
monarchies there do actually exist political oppositions in the domestic realm, 
and that the activities of political collectives within the state cause 
considerable effects on the constitution of the political community: ‘the state 
encompasses and relativizes all these antitheses. However an antithesis and 
antagonism remain here within the state’s domain which have relevance for 
the concept of the political’.40  
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Internal conflicts for Schmitt are the expression of friend/enemy-
groupings even if they are only of a secondary quality. Yet, the point is that 
the pluralism Mouffe imagines within a democratic political community is 
likewise secondary with regard to the political. Because she leaves largely 
untouched the category of the enemy, the primary political opposition 
continues to persist between the community’s identity and its ‘constitutive 
outside’: between the pluralist democrats and those who put into question the 
institutions of the community by not accepting the democratic rules of the 
game. Schmitt’s friends are renamed adversaries. What Schmitt calls 
homogeneity, Mouffe calls commonality. And what for Schmitt is ensured by 
race, the nation, a religious conviction, arête, or civic virtue,41 for Mouffe is 
provided by the democratic rules of the game, ethico-political principles of 
liberal democracy, res publica, or the assertion of liberty and equality for all.42 
There are differences, of course, but they are modest since the decisive 
criterion for both is that the common bond is strong enough to unite people in 
an alliance against an outside political collective. The primary friend/enemy-
distinction is drawn between different communities. Domestic pluralism for 
both is legitimate and possible, though in the last instance secondary. 
It is not beyond reason to maintain, therefore, that a theory of pluralist 
agonism could already be found in Schmitt with a more generous reading. Just 
as there is no striking difference regarding the quality of domestic pluralism, 
also those scattered formulations that suggest a general taming of antagonism 
very much parallel the later Schmitt’s own attempts to extricate first order 
political conflict – inimical opposition – from war.43 Finally, perhaps, one 
may wonder whether it is by chance that Schmitt already contemplates the 
possibility of mitigated, adversarial political conflict by introducing the term 
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agonism. In a corollary to the 1963 German edition of The Concept of the 
Political, Schmitt derives the German word ‘Feind’ from ‘Fehde’ (engl.: feud, 
vendetta), and explains that in the middle-ages ‘Fehde’ was differentiated into 
‘knightly and non-knightly feud’. ‘The knightly feud’, he continues, ‘leads to 
fixed forms and thereby to confront the feud opponent in an agonistic way’.44 
While Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism turns out to be more indebted to 
Schmitt’s conception of the political than one might have expected, there is of 
course no point in denying Mouffe’s analytical accomplishments. As a 
reading of Schmitt’s thought, after all, it is sufficiently selective that many 
political theorists consider it as exceptionally thought-provoking, while other 
scholars find it ‘deadly wrong’ because they see in Schmitt’s work essentially 
a rejection of political philosophy in the name of political theology.45 
Moreover, Mouffe in parts translates his theory into a poststructuralist 
vocabulary, and spells out more clearly than Schmitt that the friend/enemy-
distinction can be differentiated as types of primary and secondary (if not 
tertiary, etc.) level. From here, we can easily imagine political oppositions in 
the diagram form of a hierarchical tree; and this would certainly help us to 
overcome the one-dimensional binarity that the dichotomisation of friend and 
enemy in Schmitt’s writings evokes, as well as to take seriously the 
interconnectedness of practices of political enunciation on various social 
levels. 
(c) There is, however, a third criticism which reveals a real oddity. It 
concerns precisely Mouffe’s attempt to back up Schmitt’s conception with 
poststructuralism. Recent commentators have objected that transposing the 
poststructuralist logic of relational identity formation to politics would lead to 
a fairly different account because poststructuralism does not ground 
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antagonism and the thesis of the impossibility of a rational consensus among 
political subjects.46 
 Without delving into the technicalities of différance, the philosophical 
problem can be explained by highlighting Mouffe’s quick move to assert that 
the self/other-relation in politics necessarily takes effect in the form of the 
construction of a ‘we’ which requires the exclusion of a ‘them’. Proceeding 
from the assumption that identities are constructed and form relationally it 
clearly stands out that no all-inclusive identity could ever exist, because every 
identity requires a constitutive outside. Any ‘self’ requires the distinguishing 
reference to an ‘other’. However, if Schmitt actually anticipates the idea of 
relational and constructed identity, as Mouffe suggests,47 then she 
appropriates this idea in his anthropomorphic version. For both Schmitt and 
Mouffe determine the political opponent to consist in an empirically 
specifiable group of actually existing concrete individuals. Yet, from a 
poststructuralist perspective, there is no need to equate the ‘who/what’ of the 
‘other’ with the human. The ‘other’ is literally other. It might be found in a 
human being or a group of people, but there is no philosophical reason why it 
might not just as well be more or less fictional and abstract as the Martians or 
an uncontrolled nature of which novels tell us that they may unite mankind. 
Theoretically, the other might also be found in an animal, a plant, or a stone.48  
 To be sure, there is of course no compelling reason to expect that an 
animal, plant, or stone, an alien or natural force will ever motivate effective 
group adhesion.49 But this is an empirical, not a theoretical question. And that 
an ‘other’ can be constructed as something else than an empirically specifiable 
group of actually existing concrete individuals, and still be sufficient to 
mobilize a critical mass of people, is actually a less fanciful estimation than it 
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might seem at first glance. Historical narratives are not entirely unreasonable, 
according to which the German nation in particular, and the European political 
community more generally, have constructed (part of) their identities along 
temporal lines and put themselves into opposition to a cruel past they seek to 
leave behind.50 And in the arguably not ineffective fascist propaganda 
writings of Giovanni Gentile the decisive enemy is the solidified collective 
self; the ‘old Italian’ that must continuously be sought to be overcome by and 
within each individual.51 The point is that from a poststructuralist perspective 
the ‘other’ is always a porous and somewhat phantasmatic projection, even if 
it is indicated by reference to a human collective. As such it is constantly 
being re-negotiated from within rather than characterised by an accomplished 
exclusion of any physical exteriority.52  
Only because of the anthropomorphism can physical killing become the 
constitutive possibility of political struggles on Schmitt’s account. And only 
because the friend/enemy-distinction is determined to concern human 
collectives can he present inter-state relations as less untransparent and 
perfidious than a politics of trans- or supranationalism. Mouffe sticks to the 
anthropomorphic determination of the friend/enemy-distinction, but she draws 
slightly different consequences from it. Even though she repeatedly 
emphasizes that violent conflict between political associations is an ever 
present possibility, at no point does one get the impression that politics finds 
its essence in it, or that Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism is otherwise nourished 
by a bellicose teleology. Politics is not about war, but about the organization 
of the social space. The effective target of political action concerns the 
reconfiguration of hegemony, not the concrete agents of the hegemonic 
struggle. Even if the ‘other’ is conceptualized as a human entity, it is not 
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necessarily conducive to one’s cause to combat it in its physical existence. We 
know well enough that throughout history people have resorted to physical 
violence in order to reduce the socio-political influence of the respective 
‘other’. But we also know that to destroy an idea or to change a state of affairs 
by attacking its bearers does not always prove particularly effective. 
Sometimes, it actually causes counterproductive effects, as the history of 
Socrates, Jesus, or Giordano Bruno teaches. 
 The consequence that Mouffe does draw from the anthropomorphic 
determination of the friend/enemy-distinction, however, is that there cannot be 
an overall consensus without exclusions of concrete human beings. Schmitt is 
right, Mouffe says, ‘that a political democracy cannot be based on the 
generality of all mankind, and that it must belong to a specific people’, 
because ‘the overcoming of [the] us/them opposition’ by establishing an all-
inclusive consensus ‘is impossible’.53 Yet, as we saw, a poststructuralist 
defanging of Schmitt’s friend/enemy-distinction simply does not require the 
concretization of the ‘other’ to a ‘them’, which is to say, from a 
poststructuralist viewpoint the difference between self and other can well be 
theoretically constructed in a way as to include all human beings. The 
enactment of an effective cosmopolitan or global identity that includes all 
human beings ‘may face many obstacles’, Abizadeh concludes, ‘but 
metaphysical impossibility and conceptual confusion are not among them’.54 
Articulating such an identity certainly constitutes itself by the distinguishing 
reference to what it is not, and always excludes something in a problematic 
way. At least on the grounds of a poststructuralist ontology, in any case, it is 
plausible to let the excluded be the non-human, and to define it, for instance, 
by reference to animals, or gods, or both.  
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Now, the critical question is why Mouffe sticks to an anthropomorphic 
version of the friend/enemy-distinction at all. Why does she arrive, contrary to 
reasonable expectations, at a significantly different conclusion from Derrida in 
his deconstruction of Schmitt’s conception of the political? The commentators 
of Mouffe’s dialogue with Schmitt who lay bare this oddity tend to suggest 
that Mouffe simply does not manage to deliver a consistent poststructuralist 
argument. Mouffe is found to ‘inadvertently’ inherit Schmittian essentialisms 
and to reproduce the ‘reification of avoidable hostility’; to ‘conflat[e] 
difference (Derrida) with alterity’ and to elaborate a ‘fallacious’ argument.55 
As I set out so far, I certainly agree that we can criticize Mouffe’s dialogue 
with Schmitt in such a manner if we approach it exclusively from a 
systematic, analytical perspective; insofar as we are interested in the 
contribution of her agonistic pluralism to democratic theory and citizenship 
studies, or (because this is an arguably different thing) insofar as we are 
contemplating the possibility of a poststructuralist defanging of Schmitt’s 
conception of the political. Yet, I am decidedly sceptical that this criticism 
persists to provide a convincing interpretation of Mouffe’s dialogue with 
Schmitt and to understand the character of her academic intervention.56 We 
need to ask ourselves whether Mouffe’s anthropomorphic version of the 
friend/enemy-distinction is satisfyingly explained in terms of a failed 
transposition of Derrida’s notion of différance to politics. It is puzzling 
indeed, as Fritsch notes, that Mouffe explicitly refers to poststructuralism, 
deconstruction, Derrida, and the notions of différance and the constitutive 
outside without ever happening to discuss Derrida’s reading of Schmitt’s 
friend/enemy-distinction, in which he rejects the anthropomorphism that then 
lives on in Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism.57 Though puzzling, we may still 
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wish to hesitate drawing the consequence that Mouffe unfortunately fails to 
understand or simply neglects Derrida’s arguments. By going beyond 
Schmitt’s political theory and calling to mind his contemplations about 
political theorizing, we can bring into focus another dimension of Mouffe’s 
dialogue with Schmitt, and thus find a more plausible explanation for the 
anthropomorphic peculiarity that underlies her agonistic pluralism. 
 
3 The polemical dimension of Mouffe’s dialogue with Schmitt 
At the Nuremberg trial Carl Schmitt emphatically affirmed that during the 
Nazi-Regime he had offered diagnostics of problems, not recommendations. 
He took refuge, as Caldwell expresses it, in the claim of pure science. Even 
indulgent contemporaries were not perfectly propitiated. To them his 
haranguing about Jews, for instance, made the impression of ‘crude outbursts 
of political hate’ rather than ‘scholarly thes[e]s’ as he retrospectively 
vindicated them.58 Additional doubts arise when taking seriously the function 
that Schmitt attributes in his writings to political theorizing. In The Concept of 
the Political Schmitt forthrightly denies the very possibility of offering 
dispassionate diagnostics. He stresses that ‘all political concepts, images and 
terms have a polemical meaning’.59 Theorizing, of course, is never a neutral 
act; all theory has normative implications. Yet Schmitt goes beyond this 
truism. Political theorizing is badly understood, in Schmitt’s view, if grasped 
as offering pure diagnostics because politics is not only subjected to political 
theorizing, but also inbuilt. Rather than a collective attempt to resolve 
disagreement in opinion or nerve by the use of reason, political theorizing is a 
practical and partisan endeavour of staging disagreement by conceptual 
means. A political concept, he maintains accordingly, is ‘incomprehensible if 
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one does not know exactly who is to be affected, combated, refuted, or 
negated by such a term’.60 
 The polemical function thus attributed to political theorizing puts a new 
complexion on Mouffe’s dialogue with Schmitt on the political. If Mouffe 
were to parallel Schmitt in this respect, too, then an interpretation of her 
dialogue with Schmitt cannot exclusively be characterized by depicting the 
shape and problems of her analytical arguments. Positively stated, if it is 
plausible that Mouffe appropriates the metatheoretical facet of Schmitt’s 
intellectual heritage along with his conception of the political, then we have a 
better explanation for the divergence between Mouffe’s and Derrida’s  
respective deconstruction of the friend/enemy-distinction. For only the 
anthropomorphic version contains the political remainder that allows rejecting 
projects that aim at going beyond the adversarial model of a politics in the 
traditional left/right format. The critique of such projects, then, were to be 
evaluated not so much as the deduced implication of a (failed) 
poststructuralist reconstruction of Schmitt’s conception of the political, but as 
one that is prompted from the outset and then realized by means of a 
theoretical recontextualization. So, what suggests that Mouffe really becomes 
inspired by Schmitt’s remarks about the function of political theorizing? 
 Throughout her dialogue with Schmitt, it emerges clearly that Mouffe is 
concerned about the political lesson to be learnt from her theory. This is 
hardly surprising as Mouffe never made any pretence of her being leftist or 
‘left liberal’,61 and since affirming the practical importance of one’s writings 
is paramount in the pursuance of good practice in the present academic 
conjuncture. What is required is textual evidence that exceeds the formulaic. 
A certain rhetorical impetus may be identified in the employment of 
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essentialist language, which Mouffe does not seem eager to reduce to a 
minimum.62 While this is no rare phenomenon among academics, too, one 
might not expect this in writings that are repeatedly declared to be non-
essentialist.63 More moving is an explicit statement at the beginning of On the 
Political. ‘Although an important part of my argument is of a theoretical 
nature’, Mouffe expounds here, ‘my central aim is a political one’.64 
Remarkably, the political message takes precedence over theory in this 
quotation. If the central goal of Mouffe’s writings is a political one, then an 
analytical reconceptualization of Schmitt’s political theory is subsidiary and 
instrumental. If nothing else, then this statement at least entertains the idea 
that Mouffe contents herself with proceeding from an ontology which is 
informed by, but not fully committed to poststructuralism, in order to 
synchronize diagnostics with polemics.  
Less explicit, but likewise straightforward and, as it strikes me, highly 
resourceful is her emphasis on the term ‘the political’ itself. To see what I 
mean recall that while Schmitt affirms that concepts such as ‘class’, 
‘absolutism’, or ‘total state’ never simply can be descriptive terms,65 he 
stresses that the ‘political’ is especially susceptible to polemicization. The use 
of the term ‘political’ itself, Schmitt claims, has no existence outside of a 
polemical practice:  
‘Above all the polemical character determines the use of the word political 
regardless of whether the adversary is designated as nonpolitical (in the 
sense of harmless), or vice versa if one wants to disqualify or denounce as 
political in order to portray oneself as nonpolitical (in the sense of purely 
scientific, purely moral, purely juristic, purely aesthetic, purely economic, 
or on the basis of similar purities) and thereby superior’.66  
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Schmitt experienced that the term ‘political’ – plain or with a negative prefix 
– was frequently employed in the political discourse of his time to decontest 
one’s partisan stance or disqualify an adversary. Schmitt felt that liberals, 
especially, availed themselves of the polemic susceptibility of the term. 
Designating their own policies as non-political, they discredited those of 
others as particularistic, partial, or immoral. Schmitt intended to change this 
situation.67 Notably, let us recall, not exclusively by delving into a 
foundationalist investigation about an alleged essence of the political. That 
would be obviously paradoxical if political theorizing has no existence outside 
of a polemical practice. Instead, Schmitt intended to challenge liberals’ claim 
to moral supremacy by fielding the ‘political’ and ‘non-political’ as re-
connoted metaphors, which is to say, by engaging in (counter-)polemicization.  
It seems inconceivable that Mouffe could have glossed over Schmitt’s 
remarks about the polemical dimension of theorizing, especially as they 
explicitly concern ‘the political’ which features so prominently in Mouffe’s 
writings. If it is not excessive, then one might even feel that titles such as On 
the Political or The Return of the Political – rather than for instance ‘On 
Democracy’ or ‘Towards an Agonistic Pluralism’ – point to her intention of 
reviving Schmitt’s conception in its simultaneously analytical and polemical 
character, and of embarking on a kindred strategy to intervene into (academic) 
political discourse. 
Regarding the partisan stance Mouffe clearly does part company with 
Schmitt. Whatever the committment of Schmitt, the ‘chameleon’,68 was: 
fascist, militarist, volkstümlerisch, or simply nationalistic and ultra-
conservative. His position was definitely not left liberal or radical democratic. 
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Mouffe could hardly find a fellow partisan in Schmitt. And it would be a 
crude neglect of the contingency of political discourse to tinker with the idea 
that she could find in him a brother in arms against a common enemy. Despite 
this partisan distance, however, the metatheoretical facet of Schmitt’s 
intellectual heritage still gives Mouffe a key to reconfigure the discursive 
frontiers. His remarks, as becomes clear in the following, sparked off the idea 
to establish herself a we/them-opposition of her own by recontextualizing the 
polemical device of a political/non-political divide. 
 In her dialogue with Schmitt, Mouffe repudiates the projects of liberal 
and leftist philosophers, neoliberals and practitioners of the Third Way, right 
up to right-wing extremists, neoconservatives, and religious fundamentalists. 
A heterogeneous group indeed. She criticizes Habermas, Negri and Hardt for 
sympathizing with a cosmopolitan identity or rational consensus models; 
Beck, Giddens, and Blair for envisaging a politics beyond the adversarial 
model in the traditional left/right format, but also those who have rather 
concrete enemy images. Bush’s idea to wage a war against terrorism was not 
political in character, she tells us. His was a moralist, messianic, and 
inherently non-political endeavour.69 She makes no substantial distinction 
between those who theorize about the possibility and desirability of a rational 
consensus – like representatives of philosophical liberalism – and politicians 
who just advertise their policies with rhetorical appeals to solidarity. Quite 
generally, she maintains, officials of main political parties reduce politics to 
‘spinning’ and therefore likewise deplete the ‘political’ of its content.70 What 
justifies opposing this heterogeneity as a single collective identity is their 
respective negation of the ‘political’. They all champion, as she puts it in 
slight modification of Schmitt, ‘post-political visions’.71  
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 Within a purely analytical framework which posits that the political is 
ubiquitous and permanent, of course, the category of the ‘post-political’ is not 
easily comprehensible. Likewise it is not intuitively clear whether a good/bad 
or right/wrong frame necessarily expresses or provokes fiercer oppositions 
than a left/right (or fascist/communist, socialist/capitalist, etc.) dualism. With 
a grain of linguistic nominalism it could be said that language is contingent 
upon use, and that thus the intensity of alternative dualistic frames depends on 
the hierarchical ordering in the concrete context. That ‘the political’ is both an 
analytical and polemic device in Mouffe’s dialogue can finally be seen when 
we consider more closely what it means to negate the political. In first 
instance, it seems to testify to an escapist inclination because acknowledging 
the political is not a more demanding request than to face our ‘ontological 
condition’.72 The impression of naivety is even more clearly conveyed where 
antagonism is diluted from being characterized as permanent, ineradicable, or 
irreducible to a possibility or potential (cf. endnote 30). To deny the political, 
then, amounts to renunciating even the last bit of commonsense realism. But 
when we are told that ‘it is indeed the political, which is at stake here, and the 
possibility of its elimination’,73 then we can easily see that acknowledging the 
‘political’ is more than a realist imperative. The ‘political’, after all, cannot be 
eliminated if it is part of our ontological condition and only somebody who 
glorifies war could fear to lose it, were it the imminent peril of violent 
conflict. Cancellable are only the conditions for her radical-pluralist 
democratic vision: a democratic public sphere which allows for a nonviolent 
yet ‘vibrant’ clash of political positions.74 Adhering to her cause then is 
characterized as anything but a matter of reasonable choice or legitimate 
adversarial commitment. Once the term the political is connoted as that which 
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most of us will appreciate – democracy, nonviolence, pluralism – those who 
(are professed to) ‘deny the political’ appear as the Trojan horses of anti-
democratism. By aspiring to go beyond the adversarial model in its traditional 
left/right format they may not openly or consciously confront democracy. Yet, 
they are ‘bound to miss the real task facing democratic politics’.75 
The irony is that Mouffe’s application of the logic of inclusion/exclusion 
through the political/post-political divide reconfigures the frontiers of political 
discourse in a similarly (pseudo-)neutral – or, if you want, ‘de-politicized’ – 
language that she criticizes so adamantly at political theorists and 
practitioners. Against the symbolic imagery of a politics beyond left and right, 
Mouffe works towards forging an alliance across the borders of the left and 
right. Actually, she takes the quest of framing one’s partisan stance in a 
neutral language to its hilt: she constructs an ‘other’ that is not partisan but 
literally non-political (namely, ‘post-political’); and she demarcates it from a 
‘self’ that is not of any specific political character but the political itself. 
 
Concluding remarks 
In an interview with Ian Angus, Chantal Mouffe remembers ‘I became a 
Gramscian when I ceased to be an Althusserian. And, in fact, Gramsci was for 
me a way to find a different approach’.76 The point of this article is not to 
impose a new label and characterize her more recent work as Schmittian. To 
justify such a labelling, the differences between her purportedly ‘Schmittian’ 
writings to her other writings would have yet to be shown, and especially with 
her ‘Gramscian’ writings continuities can be expected anyway. Given the 
focus of this article on Mouffe’s dialogue with Schmitt we can just raise 
questions such as whether her and Laclau’s contemplation about strategy in 
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hegemonic struggles now has found its way into a practical application. 
Suffice it to say that among the many possible authors of the writings that are 
traded under the name Chantal Mouffe there is one who deals with and gets 
inspired by the intellectual heritage of Carl Schmitt. That author appropriates 
portions of Schmitt’s terminology and parts of his philosophical categories, 
prominently his anthropomorphic friend/enemy-distinction, but also conveys 
interest in the metatheoretical facet of his intellectual heritage with its 
emphasis on polemics. We have good reasons to believe that she has decided 
to adopt Schmitt’s anthropomorphism in order to synchronize her theory of 
agonistic pluralism with a polemical intervention. This article proposes, 
therefore, to interpret Mouffe’s dialogue with Schmitt as a contextualizing 
resurrection of his conception of the political, rather than a rigorous 
poststructuralist revision of his friend/enemy-distinction.  
Let it be noted that no criticism is connected with this claim. Like 
sophistry and rhetoric, polemics often carry pejorative connotations in daily 
and scholarly usage. Instead of being scientific, sober, and relying on the force 
of reason, polemics is sometimes envisaged as populist, cynical, and frivolous. 
However, from the lasting debate about foundationalism the conclusion can be 
drawn that scholarship does not necessarily find its ideal in devising 
arguments that stand up to the expectations of the universal audience of a 
capitalized Reason or Truth. And even foundationalists seldom insist on a 
strict dichotomization of theory and practice, philosophy and rhetoric.77 On a 
nonfoundationalist spectrum, Mouffe’s dialogue with Schmitt arguably 
gravitates more towards rhetorical-polarizing approaches than being 
committed to a pragmatist Darwinism, which recommends delivering theories 
to the test of practice. Still, even in Mouffe’s case polemics do not crowd out 
 27 
proper theorizing. In contrast to Schmitt’s account her agonistic pluralism 
never grounds the political in a bellicose teleology despite the insistence on 
the ineradicability of conflict among human collectives. Additionally, Mouffe 
more clearly breaks through the looming one-dimensionality of the 
friend/enemy-distinction by hierarchically differentiating at least a primary 
and secondary level of conflict.  
We may of course legitimately argue against her metatheoretical stance, 
or decontest the partisan goals she adopts. Hers is a democratic struggle, after 
all, not the democratic one. And there is plenty of potential for such critique 
not only from allegedly ‘post-political’ viewpoints but from radical pluralist 
positions, too. While Mouffe calls for a vibrant clash of political positions 
within democracy, she does not precisely support the endogeneous negotiation 
of the democratic procedures.78 Tally remarks, in this sense, that citizens in 
Mouffe’s vision of radical democracy assimilate players in organized sports 
rather than children on the playground who themselves negotiate the rules of 
the game.79 We may also underline the conceptual parallels in Schmitt’s and 
Mouffe’s accounts, or question Mouffe’s reading of Schmitt. Or we may 
elaborate that proceeding from alternative ontologies leads to interestingly 
different results when revising the friend/enemy-distinction. As sketched 
above, a consequent deconstruction of the friend/enemy-distinction on the 
grounds of poststructuralism suggests that identities of every conceivable kind 
can be established through the différance of self/other and still be 
meaningfully characterized as political. Philosophically, there is nothing 
wrong with the Third Way’s othering of a politics in the left/right format. Nor, 
we should add, is there anything wrong with Mouffe’s radical pluralist 
inversion which insists on the traditional adversarial model, and ironically 
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seeks to overcome factionism in a structurally similar way by displacing the 
opposition between the left and the right onto a secondary level. However, if 
we are to provide an interpretation of Mouffe’s dialogue with Schmitt we 
would do well to refrain from reducing it to its analytical dimension and from 
criticizing it for not delivering the theoretical model one might favour. We 
should instead take into account its polemical dimension and its 
interwovenness with her theory of agonistic pluralism. And if we disagree in 
substance, then we should at least acknowledge the overall coherence of this 
unlikely account. When confronting associative conceptions of the political 
with a dissociative one, after all, it is a quite compelling move to make one’s 
case in a manner that is itself dissociative and not conciliating or consensus-
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